11 Access Rights in SQL

- 11.1 The SQL security model
- 11.2 Granting and revoking privileges

Kemper / Eickler: chap. 12; Elmasri: chap. 22, Melton: chap. 14

Discretionary Access Control

• Creator responsible for ACC \Rightarrow explicit grant of rights on objects to individuals

Security model


- $\{\,(o,\,s,\,a,\,p,\,b)\,|\,access\,control\,rules\,\}$
- where:
- $o \in O$ Objects like tables, stored procedures, ...
- $s \in S$ Subjects: individual users, application progs, ..
- $a \in A$ Actions: read (SELECT), write, execute
- $\ensuremath{\mathsf{p}}$: predicate which qualifies the objects of this rule
- b: allowed to pass on rights to other individuals

HS / DBS05-14-Rights 4

11.1.1 Introduction to terminology Privacy: Users should not be able to see and use data they are not supposed to. e.g., A student can't see other students' grades. Security: No one should be able to enter the system and / or impact its behavior without being authorized to do so. e.g. delete or change data without being authorized Integrity: Authorized users should not be able to modify things they are not supposed to, (e.g. in a way which affects contraints) e.g., Only instructors can assign grades. Availability: Users should be able to see and modify things they are allowed

 Users should be able to see and modify things they are allowed to – e.g. the DB should always be operational

HS / DBS05-14-Rights 2



... Terminology Authorization: give rights to individuals Authentication: is user the one she pretends to be? Passwords encryption organizational support Auditing logging all kinds of events

SQL

- SQL Model DAC disadvantage??
- SQL implementation
 - Access matrix for rules
 e.g. Table_privileges (grantor, grantee, table, privilege, grantable)
 - Views (
 predicate)
 - Query modification
- Auditing

SQL security related terminology

- User
 - Not the schema object, just a name for a session of an individual user
 - Identification by Authorization ID (user name)
- Role
 - Name for a role, to which rights may be assigned
 - may be granted to users / applications
 - kind of convenience functionality (not in Postgres)
- · Privileges (Rights)
 - System privileges
 - Object (data) privileges: creator has all privileges
- · Operations
 - GRANT <privilege>
 - REVOKE <privilege>
- Policy

HS / DBS05-14-Rights 7

User Access Control: Privileges

· Privileges

- Right to perform SQL statement type on objects
- Assigned to users or roles (authorization IDs)
- Creator of object: all privileges for that object
- Administrator: management of system privileges


· Object Privilege types:

- SELECT [<column list>] on table or view -- most systems: no column list
 - INSERT [<column list>] on table or view
 - DELETE on table or view
 - UPDATE [<column list>] on table or view
 - REFERENCES [<column list>] : right to refer to relation in constraint
 - EXECUTE
 - ALL PRIVILEGES: short form for all privileges


HS / DBS05-14-Rights 10


•	Company	
	- Personal, accounting, inventory, orders, clients,	
•	Requirement (1) : system staff should not be able to read the data	
•	Requirement (2) : rights should be assignable in a task specific way and rights should be as restrictive as possible. Order entry clerks (or programs!) should - not be able to read any personal data - be able to insert new orders, but not modify or delete - read client data	
•	Requirement (3): rights should be assigned to functions (roles) to to people or programs	rather than
•	Requirement (4) rights should be revocable	HS / DBS05-14-Rights


User Access Control: Privileges, example SQL operations: frequently more than one privilege needed Example INSERT INTO Format (format) SELECT t.format FROM Tape t WHERE t.format NOT IN (SELECT format FROM Format); Compare Views V: · Privileges needed: when using V, no privileges - SELECT on Tape needed for the defining - SELECT on Format views or tables - INSERT on Format HS / DBS05-14-Rights 11





Roles and users
ROLES define a set of privileges for a (potentially) large set of users
CREATE ROLE sales_people; grant some privileges to sales_people grant sales_people role to users - much more economic than direct privileges (no security by obscurity, hopefully)
 roles may be assigned to roles
 often assigned to applications instead of individual users set role <rolename></rolename>
HS / DBS05-14-Rights 12














User Access Control: Privileges on views


- Creator has privilege on view if privilege on all underlying tables
- Creator loses SELECT privilege on underlying table \Rightarrow view is dropped
- Creator loses a privilege on underlying table $\,\Rightarrow\,$ creator loses privilege on view
- Creator loses a privilege held with grant option on underlying table ⇒ users who were granted that privilege on the view lose privilege on view


HS / DBS05-14-Rights 19














Access restrictions

• Views compared with explicit GRANT Advantage:

access restriction on columns and rows specified by predicate

- Important aspect not discussed: how to make applications secure?
 - e.g. Customer may see her own orders but not those of other customers Note: Customer is not an object of the DB!

see e.g. "Private Virtual Databases (PVD)" in Oracle

HS / DBS05-14-Rights 26

Summary

- · Security of DB and DB applications extremely important
- Granting privileges already in SQL / SEQUEL
- Roles make privileges with many users managable
- Implicit privileges by role lattices (part. order)
 not used in SQL
- Views play an important role, but updatability?
- Assignment of privileges / roles to applications makes web based DB applications somehow secure
- Security in DB related applications: independent "reinvention" of security subsystems
- Fine granular access restriction on objects very important in DB context.

HS / DBS05-14-Rights 27