

11 Access Rights in SQL

11.1 The SQL security model

11.2 Granting and revoking privileges

Kemper / Eickler: chap. 12; Elmasri: chap. 22,
Melton: chap. 14

11.1.1 Introduction to terminology

- **Privacy:**
 - Users should not be able to see and use data they are not supposed to.
e.g., A student can't see other students' grades.
- **Security:**
 - No one should be able to enter the system and / or impact its behavior without being authorized to do so.
e.g. delete or change data without being authorized
- **Integrity:**
 - Authorized users should not be able to modify things they are not supposed to, (e.g. in a way which affects constraints)
e.g., Only instructors can assign grades.
- **Availability:**
 - Users should be able to see and modify things they are allowed to – e.g. the DB should always be operational

... Terminology

- Authorization: give rights to individuals
- Authentication: is user the one she pretends to be?
 - Passwords
 - encryption
 - organizational support
- Auditing
 - logging all kinds of events

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Discretionary Access Control

- Creator responsible for ACC
 - ⇒ explicit grant of rights on objects to individuals

Security model

$\{ (o, s, a, p, b) \mid \text{access control rules} \}$

where:

$o \in O$ Objects like tables, stored procedures, ...

$s \in S$ Subjects: individual users, application progs, ..

$a \in A$ Actions: read (SELECT), write, execute


p : predicate which qualifies the objects of this rule

b : allowed to pass on rights to other individuals

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Mandatory Access Control

- Objects are classified according to classification hierarchy
- subjects have trustability t (clearance)



SQL

- SQL Model DAC disadvantage??
- SQL implementation
 - Access matrix for rules
 - e.g. Table_privileges (grantor, grantee, table, privilege, grantable)
 - Views (\Leftarrow predicate)
 - Query modification
- Auditing

SQL security related terminology

- User
 - Not the schema object, just a name for a session of an individual user
 - Identification by Authorization ID (user name)
- Role
 - Name for a role, to which rights may be assigned
 - may be granted to users / applications
kind of convenience functionality (not in Postgres)
- Privileges (Rights)
 - System privileges
 - Object (data) privileges: creator has all privileges
- Operations
 - GRANT <privilege>
 - REVOKE <privilege>
- Policy

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Example: Requirements for access protection

- Company
 - Personal, accounting, inventory, orders, clients, ...
- Requirement (1) :
system staff should not be able to read the data
- Requirement (2) :
rights should be assignable in a task specific way
and rights should be as restrictive as possible.
Order entry clerks (or programs!) should
 - not be able to read any personal data
 - be able to insert new orders, but not modify or delete
 - read client data
- Requirement (3):
rights should be assigned to functions (roles) rather than to people or programs
- Requirement (4)
rights should be revocable

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Access Control policy


- Policy specifies rights users should (not) have

Database Administrator
/ Operator



System related rights:

- Physical space
- create table
- create index
- create type
- create session...



DB / Application
designer



Data related rights:
access attribute of
table
modify, ...
on owned objects

Objects (tables, ...) are owned by its creator!

End user,
application
program



No rights
except those
'granted'

Grant →

→ Revoke

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User Access Control: Privileges

- Privileges
 - Right to perform SQL statement type on objects
 - Assigned to users or roles (authorization IDs)
 - Creator of object: all privileges for that object
 - Administrator: management of system privileges
- Object Privilege types:
 - SELECT [<column list>] on table or view -- most systems: no column list
 - INSERT [<column list>] on table or view
 - DELETE on table or view
 - UPDATE [<column list>] on table or view
 - REFERENCES [<column list>] : right to refer to relation in constraint
 - EXECUTE
 - ALL PRIVILEGES: short form for all privileges

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User Access Control: Privileges, example

SQL operations:

frequently more than one privilege needed

- Example

```
INSERT INTO Format (format)
SELECT t.format
FROM Tape t
WHERE t.format NOT IN (SELECT format
                       FROM Format);
```

- Privileges needed:

- SELECT on Tape
- SELECT on Format
- INSERT on Format

Compare [Views V](#):

when using V, no privileges needed for the defining views or tables

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Roles and users

ROLES

- define a set of privileges for a (potentially) large set of users


```
CREATE ROLE sales_people;
-- grant some privileges to sales_people
-- grant sales_people role to users
```

- much more economic than direct privileges (no security by obscurity, ... hopefully)
- roles may be assigned to roles
- often assigned to applications instead of individual users

```
set role <rolename>
```

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Privileges, Roles, users / applications (expl)




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Implicit Access Control

Partial order on Roles, operations and types

Roles:

- sets of privileges, no relationship between different roles
- difficult to manage
- role hierarchy



B and C have the privileges of D (implicitly) and different explicit ones


A implicitly has B and C privileges

Example above:

Store_mgr has at least rights of sales_people and techn_mgr

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Session, users, functions, roles




SESSION authorization
may be temporarily exchanged by
SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION user | role statement,
e.g. in a PL/SQL function


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Implicit access control

Operations



Types



Assignment of

- operations and types to roles
- roles to individual users (applications)

makes privileges more transparent...

...hopefully

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11.2 Granting and revoking privileges

- GRANT

```
GRANT <privileges> ON <object>
      TO [<users>|<role>]
      [WITH GRANT OPTION]
```

- GRANT OPTION: Right to pass privilege on to other users
- Only owner can execute CREATE, ALTER, and DROP

Privilege to INSERT particular columns in a table

```
GRANT INSERT
      ON <tablename(<attributenames>>)
      TO <users> [WITH GRANT OPTION]
```

Access matrix : <user> has <right> on <object>

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User level Access Control: Privileges

- Examples:

```
GRANT INSERT, SELECT ON Movie TO Klaus
Klaus can query Movie or insert tuples into it.
```

```
GRANT DELETE ON Movie TO shop_owner WITH GRANT OPTION
Anna can delete tuples, and also authorize others to do so
```

```
GRANT UPDATE (price_Day) ON Movie TO movie_staff
Staff can update (only) the price field of Movie tuples
```

```
GRANT SELECT ON MovieView TO Customers
```

This does NOT allow the customers to query Movie directly!

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User Access Control: Privileges on views

- **Creator** has privilege on view if privilege on all underlying tables
- Creator loses SELECT privilege on underlying table ⇒ view is dropped
- Creator loses a privilege on underlying table ⇒ creator loses privilege on view
- Creator loses a privilege held with grant option on underlying table ⇒ users who were granted that privilege on the view lose privilege on view

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User Access Control: Revoke privileges

- Revoke privilege

```
REVOKE <privileges>  
ON <object>  
FROM <users> {RESTRICT | CASCADE}
```


- RESTRICT: only revoke if none of the privileges have been granted by *these* users
- CASCADE: revoke from all users that have been granted the privilege by these users
- Privilege given from different users – must be revoked from all users to lose privilege

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User Access Control: Examples

Owner: **GRANT Update ON Movie TO Klaus;**

Owner: **GRANT Update ON Movie TO Anna;**



Owner: **REVOKE Update ON Movie FROM Klaus RESTRICT;**




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
User Access Control: Examples

Owner: **GRANT Update ON Movie TO Klaus WITH GRANT OPTION;**

Klaus: **GRANT Update ON Movie TO Anna;**



Owner: **REVOKE Update ON Movie FROM Klaus RESTRICT;**




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User Access Control: Examples

Owner: **GRANT** Update ON Movie TO Klaus **WITH GRANT OPTION**;

Klaus: **GRANT** Update ON Movie TO Anna;



Owner: **REVOKE** Update ON Movie FROM Klaus **CASCADE**;




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
User Access Control: Examples

Owner: **GRANT** Update ON Movie TO Klaus **WITH GRANT OPTION**;

Klaus: **GRANT** Update ON Movie TO Anna;



Owner: **REVOKE GRANT OPTION FOR** Update ON Movie FROM Klaus **CASCADE**;




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User Access Control: Examples

Owner: **GRANT Update ON Movie TO Klaus WITH GRANT OPTION;**

Owner: **GRANT Update ON Movie TO Anna;**

Klaus: **GRANT Update ON Movie TO Anna;**



Owner: **REVOKE UPDATE ON Movie FROM Klaus CASCADE;**



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Access restrictions

- Views compared with explicit GRANT

Advantage:

access restriction on columns *and* rows specified by predicate

- Important aspect not discussed:

how to make applications secure?

e.g. Customer may see her own orders but not those of other customers

Note: Customer is not an object of the DB!

see e.g. "Private Virtual Databases (PVD)" in Oracle

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Summary

- Security of DB and DB applications extremely important
- Granting privileges already in SQL / SEQUEL
- Roles make privileges with many users manageable
- Implicit privileges by role lattices (part. order) not used in SQL
- Views play an important role, but updatability?
- Assignment of privileges / roles to applications makes web based DB applications somehow secure
- Security in DB related applications: independent "reinvention" of security subsystems
- Fine granular access restriction on objects very important in DB context.